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This paper considers the role of incentive based climate adaptation policies. It uses the early literature
on pricing and capacity choices under demand uncertainty to describe how revised price structures
for the substitutes for climate services can be treated as anticipatory adaptation. In many situations
the policies determining the prices of these services make them difficult to adjust. Thus, excess demand
will not be managed through price adjustment. This situation is important because it implies that the
rationing rules determining who is served influence both capacity planning and pricing decisions. The
lesson drawn from these models is that reform of pricing policy for climate substitutes offers a ready
basis for incentive based adaptation policy. The last part of the paper offers some empirical evidence
on how the price elasticity of the residential demand for water changes with variations in seasonal
precipitation. The findings suggest marked differences between normal and dry conditions for the
Phoenix metropolitan area. These results reinforce the need to co-ordinate changes in pricing policy
with any capacity planning developed for water supplies as part of anticipatory climate adaptation.
Similar relationships may well apply for other substitutes for climatic services.
V. Kerry Smith
Department of Economics













  There is broad consensus among scientists that the climatic services, such as what the 
public might associate with local weather patterns, will change due to the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). Action on a U.S. climate policy, regardless of what it turns out to be, 
will not stop it. As a result, adaptation is now viewed as an important focus for new policies 
along with those aimed at reducing GHGs. 
  In these discussions, adaptation is described as the adjustments in natural or human 
systems that exploit the beneficial opportunities and moderate the negative effects of any 
changes arising due to the altered climate system.
1 Several maintained assumptions are taken as 
given in nearly all discussions of climate adaptation. First, it is assumed there is a key role for 
government and that anticipatory action is essential. Second, the discussions maintain that the 
experts know what to do. A mix of physical and natural infrastructure investments, coordinated 
by government, is generally presented as the best adaptive responses to expected changes in the 
climate system. Finally, it is assumed that reliance on ex post responses, by either consumers or 
firms, will magnify the damages experienced from climate change. Numerous examples could be 
used to document this summary. The National Research Council’s Adapting to the Climate 
Change, a newly released report that is likely to be influential, is one of them. It offers ten 
recommendations for adaptation. None of them considers using economic incentives as part of 
climate adaptation policy. There is nearly a complete reliance on information programs and 
government action. 
  This paper is about the design of adaptation policies that rely on economic incentives. It 
begins, following Mendelsohn [2000], by asking why anticipatory adaptation is believed to be an 
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1 This definition is consistent with what is used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  2 
 
efficient response. After that, it discusses current pricing policies for the private goods that 
households and firms can be expected to use as substitutes in adjusting to the natural services 
that are altered by climate change. Electricity for heating and cooling and water from public (and 
private) centralized water systems, are both examples of the types of substitutes used to respond 
to regional changes in temperature and precipitation. Changes in the price structure for these 
commodities may well make sense independent of anticipatory adaptation policy. Current pricing 
assumes changes in the service reliability standards with different levels of interruption and 
associated price discounts are not policy options.  
My analysis “dusts off” an early framework used in considering pricing structures with 
uncertain demand.  After reviewing the basic model, the analysis discusses alternative ways a 
natural substitute might be introduced. Four conclusions follow from the analytical model. First, 
the pricing and capacity choices for substitute services will depend on how the natural capacity is 
assumed to contribute to the services supporting people’s activities. Second, decisions to 
augment the capacity for climate substitutes, in response to a decline in natural capacity or 
changes in demand uncertainty, cannot be considered independent of the pricing policy. Third, 
and equally important, when produced capacity of the substitute is selected ex ante and its price 
is not easily adjusted, the optimal decisions depend on the rationing rule for allocating the 
available supply during periods of excess demand. When prices do not adjust easily, short run 
variation in excess demand conditions must be managed. Rules defining who is served under 
these conditions translate into changes in the reliability of service. Thus, a practical implication 
of these simplified models is to suggest that policy consider pricing service reliability. These 
price schedules could be designed to change year to year as expectations for natural conditions 
that would affect demands for climate substitutes change.  
  Finally, there is an indirect implication of incentive based adaptation for climate 
mitigation policy. The terms of access to services that substitute for natural climate conditions 
affect the value of climate mitigation. Borenstein [2005] makes a related point using a specific 
example – suggesting that dynamic pricing can increase the value of investments in residential 
solar power in some regions. This conclusion follows because the renewable power can displace 
the highest cost substitute at exactly the times that power is needed.   
  The next section outlines an economic perspective on the reasons for intervention to 
promote climate adaptation and summarizes Carlton’s [1977] version of a model to describe 3 
 
optimal pricing and capacity decisions with stochastic demand. The model is used as a template 
to consider two issues: (a) the effects of the conditions of access on the “ideal” pricing and 
capacity choices; and (b) the implications of alternative ways of characterizing climate services 
in models of the demands for substitutes. 
 
II. Climate Adaptation Policies and Substitutes 
 
A. Context 
  If the external conditions governing temperature and precipitation in a location change 
exogenously, we usually assume the people and firms affected by the change will adjust when it 
makes sense for them to do so. Of course, those involved have to be able to distinguish a 
permanent change from “normal” variability in their local environment. In the climate adaptation 
literature these types of actions are labeled as autonomous adaptations (see Fankhauser et al 
[1999]). Most of climate policy recommendations call for anticipatory adaptation which amounts 
to doing things in advance of the changes that are expected. Mendelsohn [2000] has questioned 
the need for these advance interventions. His arguments are the traditional ones we expect from 
economists. That is, if there is a market failure or incomplete information, then the first best 
response is usually to correct the source of the failure. Actions taken assuming the failures will 
persist may be inefficient.  
  In the real world some market failures are the result of practical compromises. Pricing 
policies for electricity and water reflect past metering technologies (and are changing slowly) as 
well as the regulations governing the reliability of these services. For example, we realize that 
the incremental costs of delivering another kilowatt hour of power depends on the overall 
demands imposed from the full system of users at each time. These total demands vary with the 
location, the season, the days of the week, and hours of the day. Initially it was impractical to 
have residential electric meters that provided this temporal resolution. In addition, meters had to 
be read by people. 
  Today it is not only possible to vary the recording systems for power, but the readings 
can be collected remotely. Usage could also be controlled remotely. Residential devices with 
these controls may well be cost effective in many areas independent of whether the price 4 
 
schedules are changed or service is controlled remotely. The savings in manpower reading 
meters may be sufficient to justify the change. 
  This example helps to explain the source of a failure in pricing schemes. Initially 
metering technology could not accommodate prices that adjusted to changes in the costs of 
service. In addition, the firms providing the service were regulated. To adjust prices in many 
areas these firms must seek permission from a regulatory commission. This is broadly true for 
electricity and true in many areas for residential water supplies as well.  
  Firms providing these goods face uncertain demands and varying costs of meeting a 
reliability mandate. Current practice imposes the risks created by the differential costs of meeting 
varying system demands (and prices that don’t readily adjust) on the suppliers. Significant 
changes in either the variability of demand or the costs of providing service will alter the nature 
of these risks. Changes in local weather conditions due to climate change could be one source for 
such a shift. As a result, it may be efficient to reconsider the pre-defined pricing contracts and 
reliability mandates. To illustrate the economic rationale for this suggestion, the next section 
reviews a class of models that has been used to describe socially optimal pricing and capacity 
decisions under demand uncertainty. These models assume the social objective function is to 
maximize the expected consumer surplus from the service.    
 
B. Pricing and Capacity Planning 
  Over forty years ago, a series of papers considered situations where firms (or a stylized 
description of a policy maker) faced a stochastic demand and had to select the production 
capacity and a single price for output.
2 The intended application was to motivate a 
reconsideration pricing policies for resources with these attributes. An important byproduct of 
the research was a conclusion that these choices can depend on the conditions of access to the 
resource when demand exceeds capacity and prices do not adjust. My analysis begins with the 
last paper in this sequence by Carlton [1977]. His model assumes the random component of 
demand scales the quantity demanded at each price. This paper finds that selecting a price and 
capacity to maximize expected consumer surplus would, under some conditions of access to the 
service, imply an “optimal” price above long run marginal costs. The assumed terms of access 
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when demand exceeds available capacity also affect the prospects for profits (or losses). Thus, 
they affect the need for taxes or subsidies to assure reliable provision of service.  
   Demand is a function of prices and defined as the product of two terms, x(p) and u. x(p) 
could be considered a per capita demand;  p is the price of service; and u a positive, random 
variable with distribution function F(u). u could be interpreted as a measure of the number of 
customers. Capacity is planned as multiples of unit demand under “normal” conditions. Capacity 
is given by  ) (p x s k   . So when u > s , then with a fixed price that is set in advance, not all 
customers can be served. Assuming p and s are selected before the size of u is known, then the 
policy maker must also consider rules to determine who will have their demand satisfied.  
Once decisions about capacity and price are made, the conditions of access (or rationing 
schemes) will influence what “counts” in defining the expected consumer surplus. Price does not 
play a role in clearing the market. Few markets allow instantaneous price adjustment. However, 
the assumption of no price adjustment is especially relevant to the issue of climate adaptation. 
This conclusion follows because climate’s substitute services have historically been provided in 
situations with limited price adjustment. Even when there is time of use pricing for electricity or 
increasing block structures for water, these structures amount to replacing constant prices with 
constant price schedules. The schedules are not designed to be altered based on market 
conditions or natural supply changes.   
  To illustrate the logic of the model, consider the simple graph presented in Figure 1. Price 
is measured on the vertical axis and total quantity demanded on the horizontal. With 
multiplicative uncertainty, the variability in u pivots the demand function about the choke price, 
given by the point A. At the time s and p must be selected, the planner does not know what the 
aggregate demand will be. To begin this summary, consider first the case of planning when 
efficient rationing is assumed to govern situations when demand exceeds available capacity. 
Three cases need to be distinguished to describe all possibilities: (a) demand matches exactly the 
planned capacity; in this case the diagram represents demand as ) (p x s 
 ; (b) demand is less than 
planned capacity or 
L u p x  ) ( in the figure, and (c) demand exceeds the planned capacity, given 
by 
h u p x  ) (  in the figure. If the value for the capacity that maximizes the expected surplus is s
* 
multiples of demand at the optimal price of  p , or  ) (p x s
 , then the realized consumer surplus is 
p AD . The need for a subsidy will depend on how revenue  )) ( ( p x s p
 compares with  ) (p x bs
 in 6 
 
the short run and  ) ( ) ( p x s b
   in the long run. b is the constant (per unit), variable cost of 
producing the output,  and  is the constant (per unit), long run cost of capacity. The demand 
possibilities in Figure 1, aside from the exact match with planned capacity, represent two (i.e. 
L u p x  ) ( and 
h u p x  ) ( ) of an infinite array of possible demands. Thus, the model assumes the 
policy maker focuses on the expected value of the aggregate consumer surplus net of costs. If 
demand is less than capacity (i.e. 
L u p x  ) () ,  a t   p , then consumer surplus will be  p AB and we 
consider 
L u p bx  ) ( versus 
L u p x p ) ( to determine the need for subsidies in the short run. The 
contribution to net benefits is 
L u p x p B p A ) (  less the variable (
L u p bx ) ( ) and fixed costs 
( ) (p sx  ). At  p  all consumers with willingness to pay represented along the demand curve from 
A to B want to consume the service and there is sufficient capacity to accommodate them. 
Indeed, if the price could be adjusted, more users could be accommodated because aggregate 
demand is less than the capacity. When price effectively rations use, as it does in this example, 
then benefits are defined assuming those with highest willingness to pay are served. Other 
consumers are not “counted”. At the selected price,  p , they would not purchase the good.    
  The issue of other rationing schemes arises when the aggregate demand at the price, p , 
exceeds capacity. This is case (c). All the consumers represented along the demand curve 
h u p x  ) (  from A to E would be willing to pay at least p . However, only  ) (p x s
  of this total 
demand can be served. Price does not screen out users consistent with the pre-defined capacity of 
) (p x s
 . If price cannot be raised, then someone must decide who among the consumers 
represented from A to E gets access to the service. Efficient rationing assumes those with the 
highest willingness to pay, or the segment from A to C, are the customers to be served. Random 
rationing assumes anyone from A to E has an equal chance of service.  
  The point of this earlier literature is to recognize that the definition for the access 
conditions, or the rationing rule when demand exceeds capacity, influences how the policy 
maker would select both the ex ante price and the amount of capacity. The rationing rules define 
who “counts” in the objective function. Equations (1) and (2) specify the objective functions for 
these two cases (SE for the expected surplus with efficient rationing and SR for random rationing).  7 
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In these specifications  x
1(q) is the inverse demand function for x(p) with q the quantity 
demanded at a price of p (i.e. q = x(p)). Both objective functions describe ex ante choices of p 
and s. As such, they describe what counts when demand is less than sx(p) and when it exceeds 
sx(p) for every possible value of p and s, the choice variables. Equation (1) could be written 
more compactly. This more detailed form is used because it helps to illustrate the issues to be 
considered in extending the model to include a natural supply.  
  The first term in (1) provides the contribution to expected surplus if demand is less than 
selected capacity at any selected price. The second term overstates the contribution to expected 
surplus for demand in excess of capacity. In terms of Figure 1 it would count all of the surplus 
along the demand to point E. In fact, at   p  only  ) (p x s
 units of demand can be served. So we 
need two corrections that are represented in the third term. First we remove the extra surplus 
(illustrated by
h u p CEx p x s ) ( ) (
 in Figure 1) and correct the variable cost embedded in the second 
term. The term, ) ( ) 1 ( p bx
u
s
 , removes the cost used in the second term and includes variable cost 
for only those units actually sold, bsx(p). As the more compact version of the objective function 
in equation (2) illustrates, this amount is all that can be counted for a capacity price selection 
with random rationing. Moreover in this case we attach to each unit of consumption the 
“average” surplus over the full range of users that would “like to” use the service at price p . The 
last term in equations (1) and (2) is the cost of a selected capacity. This long run cost does not 
change with the rationing schemes.   8 
 
  Table 1 summarizes the implications for capacity and price selections under the two 
objective functions and rationing schemes. The capacity/price pair for the objective function 
associated with efficient rationing summarizes the results from Brown and Johnson (with a 
somewhat different specification for capacity) and those for random rationing are taken from 
Carlton. Clearly, the selection of an “optimal” price (p) and capacity (s) pair depends on how 
access conditions are determined in periods of excess demand.  
  It is not easy to compare the capacity choices under efficient and random rationing. 
Direct results depend on what we assume for x(p) and F(u). s is defined implicitly by equality 
between the truncated expected consumer surplus of the marginal user who is not served, (less 




and the marginal capacity cost. With random 
rationing, capacity depends on the relative size of consumer surplus per unit demanded net of 
both unit variable and capacity costs compared to consumer surplus per unit net of the variable 
cost. With efficient rationing, prices would be set below long run marginal costs while with 
random rationing they would be greater than long run marginal costs.  
 
Table 1: Capacity and Pricing with Demand Uncertainty 
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a These results are derived maximizing expected consumer surplus using equations (1) and (2) in the text. F 
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refers to the inverse of the distribution function F(u). 
p ~ is defined implicitly based as the price required to assure the  unit quantity demand would equal the proportional 
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C. Adding Natural Supply  
                                                 
  9 
 
To relate these results to incentive based policies for climate adaptation I need to describe 
how the private goods substitute for climate services. Assume, for simplicity, that x is a perfect 
substitute for some climate service. If the level of natural service provided by climate is initially  
 , then each person’s demand for a substitute is conditional to the amount of   available. If   
represents the aggregate services to everyone, and climate change eliminates these natural 
services, then the market demand for the substitute would shift out by   (parallel to u p x  ) () .  I f  
we assume natural services are specific to each individual user then u p x ) ) ( (    is the market 
demand. In this case natural supply reduces needs for x but could accentuate the variability in the 
aggregate demand for x. The introduction of these natural services into the formal model in the 
simplest case (where natural supply affects aggregate demand) is similar to adding natural 
capacity. It influences how we define excess demand (the upper limits of the first integral and the 
lower limit of the second and third in equation (1) and in a similar fashion the two integrals in 
equation (2)). As a result, it influences the effects of assumptions about rationing.
3 The natural 
supply would not influence the cost of the substitutes. Nonetheless, the comparison of price and 
capacity choices with the two rationing schemes would be altered.  
Relaxing the assumption of perfect substitution between x and   is another variation that 
would further change the results. Alternatively, we could also assume the amount natural 
services affect the unit demands for x. This formulation would change the slope and position of 
x(p). Finally, we could assume that u and for   are not independent random variables. In this 
case a joint distribution for these two random variables needs to be defined and the problem 
becomes more complex.  
One does not need to display all the algebra for these cases to conclude that pricing and 
capacity decisions would change in all of them. Thus, regardless of how we treat natural supply, 
anticipatory adaptation must consider both the pricing and the conditions of access to services 
provided by the planned substitutes for climate services at the same time as capacity planning 
takes place.  
The incremental value of policies that would alter natural capacity also depends on 
adaptation policy. Access conditions determine the value of capacity as demonstrated in Table 1. 
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The lesson from this algebra is adaptation planning will implicitly (or explicitly) incorporate 
rules for allocating supply when all cannot be served. With a permanent change in the climate 
regime at some locations, these allocation rules serve to redefine reliability conditions for the 
substitute services. A more direct way of providing incentives to substitute for productive 
capacity would be by using pricing schemes that share the risks between suppliers and demands 
of these substitutes. These price structures can also be described as methods for including the 
reliability of service as part of a nonlinear price schedule. In the model these possibilities are 
represented through the rationing alternatives. In a more realistic setting, consumers would select 
among plans for service that define prices and the ability of a centralized control to remove 
service at particular intervals. These terms could vary with season, time of day, or whatever. 
They might be more complex for some substitutes than others.  
They are feasible policy alternatives today due to the changes in our ability to meter and 
inform consumers of their patterns of use. It is certainly possible to envision a consumer friendly 
device that would switch off electric appliances (i.e. heat pumps, refrigerators and so forth for 
short periods) and track the changes in usage. It is also possible to envision remote systems a 
consumer might use to monitor home usage and conditions. In the case of water as a substitute 
for climate services this type of continuous adjustment seems unlikely. Nonetheless, price signals 
that varied by season and year based on climate along with decentralized storage could be 
options that policy makers and customers might consider.  
 
III. Weather and Water 
  Climate change will alter local weather conditions. People and firms adjust by using 
substitutes. This paper’s analysis of this process envisioned changes to a system that already 
acknowledged stochastic demand for these substitutes and pricing conventions that do not allow 
markets to alter prices as the demand supply imbalance changes. As a result, the effects of new 
uncertainties on this system and the design of revised policies depend upon what is assumed 
about the interrelationships between uncertainties in the supplies of climate services and the 
stochastic demand for substitutes. Can we treat the two as approximately independent? Or are 
there reasons to believe the demand for substitutes changes when the natural services they 
displace are also more variable? The pervious section posed these as alternative model 
specifications.  11 
 
  A detailed answer for the cases of electricity and water is not possible. It is difficult to 
estimate the demands for these substitute goods under any set of conditions. This task is 
confounded by a variety of issues: inverted block rate pricing structures, limited price variation, 
incomplete metering of use (especially for outdoor uses in the case of water), and a variety of 
other challenges. Instead this section summarizes some recent empirical research on residential 
water demand in the urban Southwest that suggests independence would not be a good 
assumption. It suggests that the nature of the residential demand for water changes with seasonal 
levels of precipitation. As a result, models that treat the uncertainty in water demand and the 
response of water consumed to price as independent of the uncertainty in the climate system 
would understate the complexity of the problem.  
  Table 2 summarizes some of the estimates for the price elasticity of demand for water by 
residential users in Phoenix taken from Klaiber et al [2010]. These results were developed by 
exploiting two types of changes in water prices for Phoenix households. In each of these years 
the Phoenix water department varied residential water customers’ rates between winter and 
summer. There was also a gradual transition in marginal prices and a change in the threshold 
consumption level (in the block structure) for higher marginal prices from 600 to 1000 cubic feet 
between winter and summer. Finally, over time, the level of the marginal prices by block and 
month also changed to reflect cost increases. 
 
Table 2: Price Elasticity for Residential Water Demand
a 
 
                      Source: Klaiber et al [2010]. 
 
The estimation strategy matched records by month for years experiencing cost increases 
and evaluated the change in the quantity thresholds that define the 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90 12 
 
percentiles for residential customers in each census block group served by the Phoenix water 
department. Summer and winter months were considered separately. As a result, each 
consumption group did not move between the blocks associated with different marginal prices. 
Thus, the endogeneity of price due to “choosing” a consumption block does not need to be 
considered.  The customers in each consumption group experienced the same price change due to 
changes in the rates for each block over time.
4   
The effects of natural supply variability can be seen thru the difference in price elasticity 
estimates implied for different pairings of the years used in the models. Consumption in 2000 is 
compared with 2002 and 2003 in forming the quantity differences used to estimate the first 
difference model. The average annual precipitation (as well as in average days with measurable 
rain) in 2002 was less than half the level experienced in 2000 and 2003. The estimates for price 
elasticities in winter and summer indicate quite distinct changes when pairing two normal years 
as compared to the pairing of a normal and a dry year.
5 For the normal / dry combination, 
summer demand is much less responsive to price changes compared to the estimates derived 
using changes between two normal years. By contrast, the winter demand for a normal/dry 
combination is more responsive to price than when two normal years are used to estimate the 
price response.  
While these results are for residential water demand in one city, it is important to note 
that it is the first evidence of a response in monthly demand to differences in seasonal conditions, 
after controlling for differences in both the monthly temperatures and the monthly precipitation 
in the two years. It is consistent with an early stated preference study by Howe et al [1994]. This 
study offered a change in the likelihood, on an annual basis, of a standard annual shortage event.
6 
They found that the level of baseline reliability of the water system and average water 
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summer and is not part of the block structure. It reflects increases over time in marginal prices due to cost increases 
and would not be anticipated by households. The Olmstead et al [2007] result relates to a given increasing block 
structure and the movements within that block structure that take place due to uncertain needs for water. Our 
analysis holds constant the price block for consumption and considers how use changes over time as marginal price 
for that block changes. 
5 By pairing the consumption at a block group level we control for demographics, and landscape conditions. The 
models include temperature and precipitation controls for changes in minimum temperature and precipitation in the 
months paired to estimate the differences in quantity demanded for the paired years. 
6 This was defined as a draught of sufficient severity and duration that residential outdoor water use would be 
restricted to three hours every third day for the months of July, August, and September.  13 
 
expenditure in each of three Colorado towns influenced the choices their respondents from those 
towns would make to policies explained as being intended to enhance reliability.  
If the demand results reported here hold up in other studies, they suggest that the 
stochastic nature of water demand itself may change with factors influencing natural sources of 
climate related services. That is, one might speculate that climate change would not only alter the 
amount of water demanded as a substitute for natural sources but the price responsiveness might 
also change. This finding would imply larger price changes may be needed to induce greater 
conservation and that prices might need to depend on seasonal conditions. This conclusion 
parallels the Howe et al finding that the value of reliability depends both on the costs of water 
and the extent to which natural supply makes water shortfalls a more common event. Changing 
prices as these conditions are anticipated would offer a parallel to the more complex pricing 
systems described earlier for electricity.   
  
IV. Implications 
  Climate adaptation is not synonymous with augmenting the capacities of systems that 
provide substitutes for the climate services. Changes in pricing can reduce the demands for the 
services of substitutes (especially during times when demand is high) and can signal the potential 
for higher, long term end user costs for those with higher levels of use. Household commitments 
to power and water using devices change both the level of demand and the ability of the overall 
system to respond to climate changes that may require different uses for power and water. To the 
extent new price systems change the incentives households face as they make such power and 
water using commitments, and alter the level or the efficiency of these commitments, we might 
describe them as altering effective capacity of the system to meet households’ needs with 
variation in long run natural conditions.
7 Some types of demand are reduced or displaced. As a 
result, a smaller capacity can meet the revised demand pattern with less likelihood of shortfalls. 
This interpretation is commonly used in the demand response literature associated with pricing 
schemes for electricity. It has not been connected in formal models with discussions of climate 
adaptation.
8 
                                                 
7 Price schedules that smooth demand reduce the need for capacity to meet a peak and in this sense function like 
added capacity. See Earle et al [2009]. 
8  Smith [2009] discusses this connection but does not attempt to show a formal analysis. 14 
 
  This paper has used the early literature on pricing and capacity decisions in the presence 
of demand uncertainty to describe how an economic analysis of capacity planning, as a response 
to climate change, cannot be undertaken independent of considering how substitute services are 
priced. In addition, with inflexible prices, the rules used to determine who is served when 
demand exceeds supply will be important to both capacity and price choices. Considering the 
design of price schedules as part of anticipatory adaptation would imply that prices for a wide 
range of activities serving as substitutes for climate services might be considered. These types of 
changes offer the potential to create incentives that can feedback to influence both the pace of 
climate change and the demands for the services facilitating adaptation. 
 
Figure 1:   
Illustration of the Effects of Stochastic  
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